This study applies stochastic frontier analytic techniques in the estimation of sporting production functions. As ex ante input factors, we use pre-seasonal estimates of wage bills of players and coaches that are transformed during the production process of a season into ex post pecuniary revenues and sporting success. While in the case of athletic output we find a robust pattern of technical efficiency over subsequent seasons, the estimates based on economic output highlight the instability of the German soccer industry.
Introduction
European professional soccer has shown dynamic economic growth over the past decade. Some of the top clubs (companies) invest in excess of 50 million EUR annually in their players and management as they vie for success on and off the pitch.
Human capital, which is comprised predominantly of players and coaches, is without doubt the central factor of production. The economics of soccer is growing parallelly to the economic significance of the industry. Economists prefer to measure performance in relative rather than absolute terms. As do the fans: "They made the most of what they had" or "they didn't live up to their potential" is typical commentary as to the seasonal performance of a team. Behind this stands the theoretical concept of the production function of a soccer corporation. Clubs invest in players, coaches, and management in order to succeed in the several competitions they take part and thereby increase revenue from the gate, broadcasting rights, merchandising and sponsoring. Of course most clubs still consider success on the pitch and the glory of victory as their main business objective. However, clubs are also focussing more and more on the economic ramifications of their striving for success: Shareholders expect a risk-adequate return on their investment, creditors require solid cash flow and interest coverage. Given that for all clubs in a national league the same production technology applies, the managerial efficiency of each can be measured in terms of success relative to their potential.
There exists a strand of recent literature on sporting production functions, which differs in three primary characteristics: the league(s) under investigation, the choice of input and output variables 1 , and the statistical technique or econometric strategy 2 followed. Most of this work has dealt with U.S. major league sports (primarily Major League Baseball), as pioneered by Rottenberg (1956) . As for soccer the focus so far has been on the English F.A. Premiership; see Carmichael et al. (1999) , Dawson et al. (2000) , Dobson and Goddard (2001, Ch. 5, Sect. 5.2-5. 3), and Gerrard (2001) . Carmichael et al. (1999) estimate a team's performance production function using OLS regressions only. The same holds for Gerrard (2001) who concentrates on the win-ratios of the coaches working in the Premier League from 1992-1998. The OLS approach falls short in that only an average efficiency production function is estimated not the full scale one. Efficiency in this case can only be assessed relative to the "average club" not to the individual full efficiency benchmark. Dawson et al. (2000) compare the efficiency rankings from an OLS regression to those resultant from their stochastic frontier analytic estimates. For the years 1992-1998, they examine what coaches could make of a certain amount of playing talent in terms of success in the Premiership.
Our study is the first to look at the German top league, i.e. the Erste Bundesliga, using stochastic frontier analysis. Inputs are the ex ante fixed wages for the players and the coach, while several team-and season-specific characteristics are controlled for. Most studies measure success on the pitch in terms of league performance: As it is obvious that clubs base their investment decisions to a high degree on the a priori knowledge whether or not they participate in the international competitions, we define an output variable "score" (henceforth SCO). SCO summarizes the success of German Bundesliga 3 clubs in all competitions in one value. Economic output is measured in terms of revenues. We look at the two subsequent seasons 1999/00 and 2000/01 assessing the team performances separately for each season. Therefore, we investigate a pooled one-period-model with the teams' pre-season market investments in players and coaches judged by output the following summer; cf. Dawson et al. 3 We use the term Bundesliga to denote the German top league, i.e. Erste Bundesliga. Actually, there exist the Erste Bundesliga and the Zweite Bundesliga (both containing 18 teams, respectively).
However, due to its common usage and since some of the analyzed teams were top league members only in one of the investigated seasons, it seems better not to multiply terms. (2000) . Analyzing a two season pool, we face 36 observations for the 21 Bundesliga teams participating in one or both years. Investigating which teams consistently operated efficiently or inefficiently in these two subsequent seasons from 1999-2001 is a first step in examining the development or constancy of efficiency. Scarcity of the relevant Bundesliga data so far impedes a longer horizon, the implication of autoregressive parts in our regressions, as well as the estimation of time-dependent efficiencies and panel data models. 4 All the more, our study aims to shed some light on the managerial transformation process from human capital to measurable output -a "black box" and source of weekly speculation -in German top league soccer.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset used, preliminaries, and applied methods. Section 3 reports our findings on sporting and economic efficiency, respectively. And finally, Section 4 concludes.
Data and Stochastic Production Frontier Methodology

Choice and Adjustment of Data
In the present study productive output of soccer clubs is measured not only by the success on the pitch but also by adjusted total revenues (henceforth REV). In contrast to existing related work, we quantify athletic output not only for the national but also for the international European competitions. The following paragraphs focus on the outline of our pecuniary variables of investigation. For detail on our sporting output measure SCO the reader is referred to Appendix A.1. While there is an amazing amount of data available on sporting results and performances for most European professional national soccer leagues, economic data on soccer clubs is generally scarce. One notable exception is England, where many soccer companies are listed on stock exchanges and therefore must by law publish their annual reports. In Germany the only club to undertake an initial public offering until the end of 2002 was Borussia Dortmund. At this time an additional seven clubs were constituted joint-stock companies. However, this does not imply that they necessarily have to make their balance sheets available to the public. This is one reason we choose figures of revenues rather than, e.g., (operating) profits. Operating profits are "defined" in quite different ways by managements before presentation in the general meetings of the club members. Furthermore most club managements do not follow a stringent shareholder value orientation. Ultimately, this is the result of generic moral hazard:
The central incentive of management is the generation of glory, the result of wins and club titles, and in so doing maximizing their own reputation or popularity rather than the club's profits. Where available, data for total revenues, for the respective season, are taken from the income statements of the clubs -otherwise from the studies of the WGZ-Bank (2001 , 2002 . However, it would be desirable to isolate the output that depends exclusively on the performance and management in the respective season.
Identifying exact marginal gate revenues, marginal merchandising income, or the like is impossible. The adjustment suggested in the following is a step in the direction to unravel performance-dependent output. The league's income from TV-broadcasting rights by the end of the last decade was as follows: In 1999/00 every club in the Bundesliga received a fixed TV-rights-transfer of approximately 6 million EUR. In 2000/01 a new TV-broadcasting contract nearly doubled the two top leagues' income from 212 million EUR to 386 million EUR a year. For this substantial additional cash-flow, the clubs agreed on creating a variable income component that should for more than 80 percent (i.e. 83%) depend on the respective Bundesliga-club's finishing positions in the three preceding years. The rest was hooked to the performances in the respective season. To take this effect into account, we subtract from a club's revenues the respective certain pay-off through TV-broadcasting rights at the beginning of the season, i.e. the fixed and the 3-year-payments.
Scarcity of balance sheet data for German clubs explains why we base our econometric analysis of REV and SCO mainly on wage bill data, rather than on data on equity or total capital employed. However, wages can only reasonably proxy management-installed human capital if they do not include bonus payments and premia that are received during and depend on the productive process, i.e. the intra-seasonal performances. This leads us to use pre-seasonal estimates of the wage sums of players (PLW) and coaches (COW) instead of end-of-season data due to the fact that the former are independent of a teams future intra-seasonal success. These data are published at the beginning of each season by the German sports magazine Der Kicker. They capture usable means of production. Their installation (bargains and recruitments on the transfer markets, etc.) and transformation into measurable output are the chief task of the manager. To move beyond the slogan of quantitatively assessing some sort of ad hoc produc-5 Cf. the comprehensive discussion of this argumentation on the transformation of ex ante inputs into ex post performance in the context of sporting production functions in Dawson et al. (2000) .
6 See UFA Sports GmbH (2000) , where the brand potential of German Bundesliga clubs is assessed on the base of interviews from a sample identifying 21.5 million soccer fans in Germany. Among a set of other questions, participants were asked for their (main) supporting of a certain club.
Unfortunately, the study reports the first nine most frequently mentioned Bundesliga clubs only.
To overcome the problem of a truncated ordinal regressor, we decided for a binary top-brand rather than a categorial dummy. 7 Note, in his study based on data of the Dutch national soccer league, Koning (2003) finds that intra-seasonal firing and hiring of coaches does not improve team performance.
tion process, we test the straightforward Cobb-Douglas technology
where H p and H c denote ex ante human capital of players and coaches, respectively, against a more flexible translog specification. In log-linearized form, we consider:
and
where minor letters denote expressions in natural logs, As can be seen from Table 1 , an F-Test on the joint hypothesis β 3 = β 4 = β 5 = 0 is on all conventional levels of significance and for both dependent variables, i.e. ln(REV) and ln(SCO), unable to reject the null of a Cobb-Douglas (CD) technology. Obviously, neither the null of a CD-type production function nor the one of homoskedasticity can be rejected on the one percentage level of significance. Note: *, **, *** denotes significance on 10, 5, 1% level of significance; t-values given in parentheses.
8 Note, as will be outlined later, the model for economic output, i.e. for the endogenous variable ln(REV), considers UFA, CHL, and S01, while the model for ln(SCO) controls for participation in international cups (INT) only. 9 Note, we also considered UEFA cup participation (UEF) as well as the more general participation in international cups (INT = CHL + UEF). However, we obtain best results for the specifications of Note: *, **, *** denotes significance on 10, 5, 1% level of significance; t-values given in parentheses.
While in the case of economic success (dependent variable natural log of REV),
we find a significant decrease of the technological residual from season 1999/00 to 2000/01, there is no significant inter-seasonal change in technology for athletic output; see the last entries of Table 2 (a) and (b). As expected, with regard to, e.g., the merchandising industry, the fan potential variable UFA shows a positive, highly significant impact on revenues, while it is estimated insignificantly in the explanation of our scores variable SCO. One reason might lie in the truncation of the demand for tickets (especially, for top matches) due to limited capacity of the stadiums. This restriction of capacity puts the impact of (potential) supporters on sporting success into perspective. For both regression exercises reported in 11 Due to collinearity problems, we restricted the regressions to one international participation dummy and based our choice on the respective explanatory power. 12 One reason for the latter might be that an average production frontier is not the adequate specification. However, this reasoning is only suggestive for an error decomposition (in pure noise and efficiency) and not a significance based test. We will investigate this further using likelihood ratio tests and a test suggested by Coelli (1995) in Section 2.3.
Abstracting from the constant that is significant on the five percentage level, the remaining parameter coefficients of the linearized AK production function are now significant on all conventional levels. Estimates (4) The literature on the economics of European top league team sports suggests that the market structure of the leagues is characterized by "rat races" and coordination failures; see, e.g., Szymanski and Smith (1997) for the English Association Football
League and Akerlof (1976) in general. Therefore, we would not expect constant or increasing but rather decreasing returns to scale to be at work in the Bundesliga. Not surprisingly, our estimates cannot reject the hypothesis of decreasing returns to scale on all conventional levels of significance (the detailed F-Test results are available on request from the authors).
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stochastic Frontiers
The central idea of stochastic frontier analysis to distinguish between shifts in the technological frontier and efficiency, i.e. a movement towards or away from the technological frontier, can best be illustrated by a schematic multi-panel figure, as given at the end of the Appendix. The three panels compare the output of two sample teams, j and k, as a function of human capital input H. Given the same production technology, the higher output of club k in comparison to club j can occur for four possible reasons: First, this can be due to differences in input levels, as displayed in the top panel. Second, the technological base level of production may differ between the two clubs, with the consequence that for the same level of inputs different outputs result; see the second panel. In this case, the technological lead is measured
Third, it might be that club j produces less efficiently than club k. In other words, both clubs face the same frontier and the same input level, however, output of team j is lower; see bottom panel. Here, inefficiency is given by the distance u j − u k = Y k − Y j . Finally, differences might be due to a combination of these three plus noise. The isolated Solow residual fails to discriminate between the second and third situation (displayed in the second and third panel), while stochastic frontier methods allow this important distinction.
The most general model in the class of stochastic production frontier specifications is that by Battese and Coelli (1995) . It is formulated for panel data with firm effects that are assumed to be distributed as half or truncated normal random variables, whereby these effects may be modelled by some regressors (so called technical efficiency, henceforth TE, effects models), and may be permitted to vary systematically over time.
m it = z it δ, where -y it denotes the natural log of production of the i-th micro unit in the t-th time period; -x it is a k × 1 vector consisting of control variables and input quantities (in natural log expression) of the i-th micro-unit in the t-th time period;
-β is a vector of unknown coefficients, over which the likelihood will be maximized;
-v it represent random variables which are assumed to be i.i.d. N 0, σ 2 v and independent of the -u it = u i e −η(t−T ) non-negative random variables which are assumed (i) to account for technical inefficiency in production and (ii) to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N m it , σ 2 u distribution; where m it is defined above and -z it is a p × 1 vector of variables which may influence the efficiency of a microeconomic unit; and maximized, and for which δ 0 = µ.
The cross-sectional nature of our dataset allows for specification (5) the case of T = 1 (cross-section) and η = 0 (time-invariant inefficiency) only. Depending on the choice of specifying δ as zero-vector or not, we suppose an error decomposition frontier or a TE effects model, respectively. Imposing for the former µ = m i = m = 0, we obtain a half-normal specification of the distribution of inefficiencies u i . With no assumption on µ, the truncated normal specification of Stevenson (1980) results. For µ = 0, it is implicitly assumed that the inefficiency effects u i are distributed half-normal (HN), whereas the specification of Stevenson (1980) is more general, inasmuch it only supposes a truncated normal (TN) distribution without restriction on its first moment.
Following the parameterization of Battese and Coelli (1995) , we use the replacement of σ 2 v and σ 2 u with σ 2 = σ 2 v + σ 2 u and ρ = First, the (nested) standard normal (corresponding likelihood maximizing objective:
, second, the HN (corresponding objective: max {β;ρ} L), and, finally, the TN (corresponding objective: max {β;ρ;µ} L) as proposed by Stevenson (1980) . For all three distributional assumptions on the inefficiency vector, we also estimate the respective TE specification, where we consider COW i as m i -variable (directly impacting on the efficiency of a team). The intuition behind this specification is that especially the respective coach is responsible for the creation of an "efficiency-environment" in the production of athletic and (maybe less so) economic performance. Additionally, we refine the three-step estimation strategy of Battese and Coelli; see Coelli (1992) : 13 Accordingly, the three steps are:
13 Actually, we partly rely on their freeware Fotran77 program FRONTIER 4.1, i.e. the latest follow-up version of FRONTIER 2.0, as outlined in Coelli (1992) .
1) Obtain OLS estimates of the production function at stake.
2) Conduct a two-phase grid search of ρ, with β coefficients (excepting β 0 ) set to the OLS values; where any other parameters (η, µ and δ-vector) are set to zero in the grid search.
3) Use the values selected in the grid search as starting values in an iterative procedure (using the DFP Quasi-Newton method) to obtain the final maximum likelihood (ML) estimates.
After some preliminary estimates and numerical exercises, we call this relatively strict procedure (with regard to the optimality region of the logL value) into question and suggest to replace the second step by:
2') Estimate the model, i.e. maximize the likelihood function over the β-and u i -vector, under the assumption of the nested standard normal distribution 
The latter is a joint equality and inequality hypothesis. Its test statistic is a mixture of χ 2 distributions, where upper and lower bounds for critical values are given in 14 A code for GAUSS, using the GPE2 package by Lin (2001) , is available on request from the authors. It implies a stopping criterion, in the sense that it restricts the incremental grid search to take no longer than 24 hours on a PC with the power of a Pentium IV CPU.
technical inefficiency in the data is the third moment of the distribution of the OLS residuals: If u i = 0 for all i = 1, ..., N, then the OLS error ε i = v i is symmetric, and the data do not support a technical inefficiency story. However, if u i > 0, then The test by Coelli (1995) avails this feature of the OLS residual vector. Accordingly, under the null of zero skewness of the error terms in equation (1), the following test statistic K is asymptotically distributed as standard normal
In the next section, we report our results, where the choice of model has been based on the above strategy 1), 2'), and 3) and tests on the adequate specification out of the set: OLS, HN error decomposition model, TN error decomposition model, HN-TE effects model, and TN-TE effects model.
Results
Success on the Pitch: Sporting Efficiency
As argued above, the residuals of the OLS estimate reported in (4') are suggestive for a stochastic frontier model to the extent that they are negatively skewed, as reflected in a third moment S 3 = −0.106. The implied test statistic by Coelli (1995) , Table 3 below. Again, it is noteworthy that we abstract from COW as well in our stochastic frontier model (6) due to the fact that wages of coaches neither play a significant role in the determination of athletic output nor in the creation of an efficient environment (TE effects specification) according to our estimates. Not surprisingly, INT is again estimated strongly significant as teams can ceteris paribus attain more SCO-points if qualified internationally. Table 3 of the season, they collected only 3.81 SCO-points ending last but one in Table 3 . Note: In parantheses respective rank according to the sum of EFF-ranks is given.
3.2 Success off the Pitch: Economic Efficiency.
Contrary to (4'), OLS estimate (3) neither shows a weak fit nor any indication in favor of an ED or TE effects model. Although none of the considered stochastic frontier models passes the adequate LR test, we succeed in marginally improving the likelihood by decomposing the error term. Note: *, **, *** denotes significance on 10, 5, 1% level of significance; t-values given in parentheses.
In analogy to equation (6) above, Table ( 5) displays our estimates with best fit.
As argued above, we used a half normal ED model to obtain initial values for the DFP algorithm in the estimation of the HD-ED model.
As described in Section 2.2, we not only find that there is a significant coherence between wages of players and coaches and the overall economic output of a team, but also learn that there is a technological downward shift from season 1999/00 to 2000/01. This means, in terms of our supposed production function, that more wages had to be invested to reach the same REV level than in the year before. Here the "rat race" for the limited amount of output comes back into play. PLW, e.g., 15 A different story might hold for Hansa Rostock being the only Bundesliga team from the former GDR for a long time. They benefit from a regional monopoly and a strong sympathy throughout the Neue Bundesländer. In the following economic efficiencies are discussed for those teams that showed a robust 'top' or 'flop' ranking pattern. Being part of the respective upper or lower quartile (top-4 / flop-4) of the ranking for all three models, is considered a robust result. As can be seen from Table 6 therefore, seems to be that the club attained this relatively high REV with average wages. Furthermore, this stands despite the fact that its team neither participated in the Champions League in 1999/00 nor does it belong to the better loved half of the league (UFA fan dummy = 0).
Surprisingly, Stuttgart ended at the very bottom in the succeeding season; see Table 6 (b). The club increased wages for its staff above the average but reached a rather low (adjusted) REV of 14.7 million EUR. This might to some degree be explained by its weak performance in the national league that season (ending 15th).
SV Werder Bremen also turns out to be robustly top4-efficient (as regards REV)
in 1999/00. The club generated the eight highest REV with below-average PLW 
Conclusion
The present study contributes to the existing literature on managerial efficiency in professional team sports. In a stochastic frontier framework we empirically assess the performance of German Bundesliga-clubs in the two seasons 1999/00 and 2000/01.
In contrast to existing studies applying DEA, we are able to make significance based statements and to consider stochastic deviations from the efficiency frontier. Furthermore, we choose our production technology specifications on a series of tests and refine the estimation procedure proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) .
The player talent constitution of teams is found to be of paramount importance for success on and off the pitch. Surprisingly, paying a high salary to the coach seems to have no significant impact on the athletic output. A robust pattern of technical efficiency over the subsequent seasons is found for athletic performance, while the estimates based on economic output highlight the instability of the German soccer industry. In both cases only a few clubs show persistently a low or high level of efficiency.
the least weight in Germany, especially, since it generates the least additional money and due to the possibility of winning the title after lucky draws and only six matches.
We take the above ranking as a basis for our scoring-system. Winning the UEFA-CL is ascribed ten, the national league nine, the UEFA-Cup eight, and finally the DFB-Cup seven SCO-points. Economic implications of the different performances do not play a role in the construction of the SCO-variable. It is only the success on the pitch that is being reflected in SCO-points. We, therefore, clearly discriminate between the marginal impact of reaching a final and actually winning it. The reason is that title-wins are what success on the pitch is standing for and less semi-final qualifications etc. Accordingly, the runner-up in the UEFA-CL (UEFA-Cup, DFBCup) receives eight (six, five) SCO-points, the two semi-final losers seven (five, four)
SCO-points. This system also ensures that the ordinal ranking of the three cup competitions stays the same whichever group stage. Table A In the national league competition the teams play 34 matches against each other and collect three points for a win, one point for a draw. We decided to transform the points in the league rather than the final league position into our SCO-system such that success on the pitch is mapped more exactly. As in the other competitions the runner-up stays two SCO-points short of the champion, i.e. they collect seven SCO-points. Teams finishing third or lower receive SCO-points determined by the following equation:
SCO i | league = 9 league-points i league-points Ch − 2, (A.1)
where league position i = 3, ..., 18 and subscript Ch denoting champion.
By (A.1) the league performance is benchmarked to the performance of the champion with the restriction that no other team can collect more than seven SCO-points.
Since we are not interested in the future economic implications of league positions, there are no SCO-premiums or -discounts for European cup qualifications or relegations. Table A 
